Our voting records

Search our voting records

Below you will find a fully searchable table of our UK and European voting records, going back as far as 2004 (note that we only started disclosing our European votes in December 2011). You can view all resolutions where we voted against or abstained for each individual company by selecting from the drop-down list, or view the comments on the vote cast by selecting the resolution detail link. Where we have not supported a board's recommendations, a brief explanation is included.

We make the voting records available monthly, two weeks in arrears. If you have any problems using the search facility please don’t hesitate to contact us.

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Voting records
    Resolution    
Meeting Type Company No. Detail Vote Cast Country
04/04/2013
Annual
Volvo AB 18 Amend Articles Re: Insert Gender Quota for Board of Directors

Shareholder Proposal

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Sweden
04/04/2013
Annual
Volvo AB 19 Request Board to Consider Increasing Apprenticeships

Shareholder Proposal

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Sweden
10/04/2013
Annual
Svenska Cellulosa Ab (Sca) 15 Amend Articles Re: Insert Gender Quota for Board of Directors

Shareholder Proposal

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Sweden
11/04/2013
Annual
BP plc 2 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policy has the potential to reward executives for achieving unchallenging performance conditions.

Against United Kingdom
11/04/2013
Annual
BP plc 8 Re-elect Antony Burgmans as Director

Re-elect Director

We voted against the re-election of the Remuneration Committee Chairman to emphasise and underline concerns regarding remuneration policy and practice.

Against United Kingdom
11/04/2013
Annual
BP plc 10 Re-elect George David as Director

Re-elect Director

We abstained on the re-election of the Remuneration Committee member to emphasise and underline concerns regarding remuneration policy and practice.

Abstain United Kingdom
11/04/2013
Annual
BP plc 11 Re-elect Ian Davis as Director

Re-elect Director

We abstained on the re-election of the Remuneration Committee member to emphasise and underline concerns regarding remuneration policy and practice.

Abstain United Kingdom
11/04/2013
Annual
BP plc 12 Re-elect Dame Ann Dowling as Director

Re-elect Director

We abstained on the re-election of the Remuneration Committee member to emphasise and underline concerns regarding remuneration policy and practice.

Abstain United Kingdom
11/04/2013
Annual/Special
Klepierre 4 Approve Auditors' Special Report on Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

Insufficient disclosure was provided on the detail of the transactions.

Against France
11/04/2013
Annual/Special
Klepierre 8 Authorise Repurchase of Up to 5 Percent of Issued Share Capital

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
15/04/2013
Annual
Borregaard ASA 3.3 Approve Remuneration Policy And Other Terms of Employment For Executive Management (Binding)

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Against Norway
15/04/2013
Annual
Borregaard ASA 6.1 Authorize Share Repurchase Program in Connection with Employee Incentive Programs

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Against Norway
17/04/2013
Annual
Carnival plc 15 Advisory Vote to Approve Compensation of the Named Executive Officers

Remuneration Report

We did not feel it was appropriate that executives should receive bonuses on the basis that there were a number of incidents during the year involving the ships operated by the company. One of these resulted in customer fatalities, and others had a negative impact on the company’s reputation with its customers. The financial performance of the company was also affected.

Against United Kingdom
17/04/2013
Annual
Carnival plc 16 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

We did not feel it was appropriate that executives should receive bonuses on the basis that there were a number of incidents during the year involving the ships operated by the company. One of these resulted in customer fatalities, and others had a negative impact on the company’s reputation with its customers. The financial performance of the company was also affected.

Against United Kingdom
18/04/2013
Annual
Adecco SA 1.2 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Against Switzerland
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Altamir Amboise 4 Approve Auditors' Special Report Regarding New Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

Insufficient disclosure was provided on the detail of the transactions.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Altamir Amboise 14 Amend Article 10 of Bylaws Re: Owners of Preferred Stock (B Shares)

Amend Articles/Bylaws

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 8 Authorise Repurchase of Up to 10 Percent of Issued Share Capital

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 11 Approve Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities for up to 10 Percent of Issued Capital Per Year for Private Placements up to Aggregate Nominal Amount of EUR 50 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 12 Authorise Board to Increase Capital in the Event of Additional Demand Related to Delegation Submitted to Shareholder Vote

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 13 Authorise Capital Increase of up to 10 Percent of Issued Capital for Future Acquisitions

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 15 Authorise Board to Set Issue Price for 10 Percent Per Year of Issued Capital Pursuant to Issue Authority without Preemptive Rights

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 17 Authorise up to 1.5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Stock Option Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

Lack of disclosure on performance criteria

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
Gecina 18 Authorise up to 1.5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

Lack of disclosure on performance criteria

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 3 Approve Auditors' Special Report on Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

We were not sufficiently reassured by the company that this would be fair to all shareholders

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 15 Authorise Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Pre-emptive Rights up to Aggregate Nominal Amount of EUR 50 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 16 Approve Issuance of Shares up to 20 Percent of Issued Capital Per Year up to EUR 50 Million Reserved for Qualified Investors or Restricted Number of Investors

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 17 Authorise Board to Set Issue Price for 10 Percent Per Year of Issued Capital Pursuant to Issue Authority without Pre-emptive Rights Under Items 15 and 16 Above

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 18 Authorise Board to Increase Capital in the Event of Additional Demand Related to Delegation Submitted to Shareholder Vote Under Items 15 to 17

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 19 Authorise Capital Increase of Up to EUR 50 Million for Future Exchange Offers

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 23 Authorise up to 1 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

Lack of disclosure on performance criteria

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual/Special
LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton 24 Amend Article 18 and 29 of Bylaws Re: Related-Party Transactions, Stock Dividend Program

Amend Articles/Bylaws

It is our view that this bundled resolution included provisions that could weaken disclosure of related party transactions.

Against France
18/04/2013
Annual
Persimmon plc 2 Approve Remuneration Report

Ex-gratia Payments

We do not support ex-gratia & other payments and financial awards to directors and former directors that are not within the terms of the company’s stated remuneration policy, unless such payments have been subject to prior approval by shareholders.

Against United Kingdom
19/04/2013
Annual/Special
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 2.1 Slate 1

Slate Nominees

Shareholders can only vote in favour of one slate, and this slate does not best represent the interests of shareholders.

Against Italy
19/04/2013
Annual/Special
Banca Popolare dell'Emilia Romagna 2.3 Slate 3

Slate Nominees

Shareholders can only vote in favour of one slate, and this slate does not best represent the interests of shareholders.

Against Italy
22/04/2013
Annual
BinckBank NV 8a Amend Articles Re: Legislative Changes

Amend Articles/Bylaws

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Netherlands
22/04/2013
Annual
BinckBank NV 8b Authorise Board Members and NautaDutilh N.V. to Ratify and Execute Approved Amendments Re: Item 8a

Amend Articles/Bylaws

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Netherlands
23/04/2013
Annual
Syngenta AG 1.2 Approve Remuneration Report

Executive Incentive Schemes

The incentive scheme appears to have no clear award policy and an absence of performance conditions.

Abstain Switzerland
23/04/2013
Annual
TOMTOM NV 10 Approve Granting of Subscription Rights for Ordinary Shares under Employee Stock Option Plan and Management Board Stock Option Plan and Exclude Pre-emptive Rights

Authorise Issued Capital for use in Incentive Plan

The underlying features of this scheme did not reflect international best practice. We therefore did not support this authority to allocate shares to the scheme.

Against Netherlands
23/04/2013
Annual
TOMTOM NV 11 Approve Call-Option Agreement with Company Friendly Foundation

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against Netherlands
23/04/2013
Annual
TOMTOM NV 14.ii Amend Article 5.6 Re: Term to Convene General Meeting in Case of Issuances of Preference Shares

Amend Articles/Bylaws

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Netherlands
24/04/2013
Annual
AZIMUT HOLDING S.p.A. 6 Authorise Share Repurchase Program and Reissuance of Repurchased Shares

Share Repurchase

The structure of this authority was against best practice guidelines, therefore we were unsupportive.

Against Italy
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA A1c Eliminate Pre-emptive Rights Re: Issuance of Subscription Rights

Option awards to Non-executive Directors

We do not believe that Non-executives should receive other remuneration in addition to their basic fees, given that their role is to constructively challenge and scrutinise management and contribute to the development of strategy.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA A1d Approve Non-Employee Director Stock Option Plan: Issuance of 185,000 Warrants

Option awards to Non-executive Directors

We do not believe that Non-executives should receive other remuneration in addition to their basic fees, given that their role is to constructively challenge and scrutinise management and contribute to the development of strategy.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA A1e Renew Authorisation to Increase Share Capital within the Framework of Authorised Capital: Issuance of Warrants under item A1d

Option awards to Non-executive Directors

We do not believe that Non-executives should receive other remuneration in addition to their basic fees, given that their role is to constructively challenge and scrutinise management and contribute to the development of strategy.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA A1f Approve Deviation from Belgian Company Law Provision Re: Grant of Warrants to Non-Executive Directors

Option awards to Non-executive Directors

We do not believe that Non-executives should receive other remuneration in addition to their basic fees, given that their role is to constructively challenge and scrutinise management and contribute to the development of strategy.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA A1g Authorise Implementation of Approved Resolutions and Filing of Required Documents/Formalities at Trade Registry

Option awards to Non-executive Directors

We do not believe that Non-executives should receive other remuneration in addition to their basic fees, given that their role is to constructively challenge and scrutinise management and contribute to the development of strategy.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA B9a Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual/Special
Anheuser-Busch InBev SA B9b Approve Stock Option Plan Grants

Executive Incentive Schemes

The structure of this scheme is not aligned with the interests of shareholders

Against Belgium
24/04/2013
Annual
STV Group plc 9 Approve Value Creation Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

The structure of this scheme is not aligned with the interests of shareholders

Abstain United Kingdom
25/04/2013
Annual
Aggreko plc 2 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Abstain United Kingdom
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 4 Approve Auditors' Special Report on Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

Insufficient disclosure was provided on the detail of the transactions.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 15 Authorise Repurchase of Up to 5 Percent of Issued Share Capital

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 19 Authorise Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities without Pre-emptive Rights up to Aggregate Nominal Amount of EUR 150 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 20 Approve Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities for up to 20 Percent of Issued Capital Per Year for Private Placements, up to Aggregate Nominal Amount of EUR 150 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 21 Authorise Board to Set Issue Price for 10 Percent Per Year of Issued Capital Pursuant to Issue Authority without Preemptive Rights

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 22 Authorise Board to Increase Capital in the Event of Additional Demand Related to Delegation Submitted to Shareholder Vote Above

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 24 Authorise Capital Increase of Up to EUR 150 Million for Future Exchange Offers

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 25 Authorise Issuance of Equity upon Conversion of a Subsidiary's Equity-Linked Securities for up to EUR 150 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 27 Approve Employee Stock Purchase Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

The dilution limits under this scheme exceeded best practice guidelines, we were therefore unsupportive.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 28 Authorise up to 5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 29 Authorise Board to Issue Free Warrants with Preemptive Rights During a Public Tender Offer

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Bouygues 30 Allow Board to Use All Outstanding Capital Authorizations in the Event of a Public Tender Offer or Share Exchange Offer

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual
Colt Group SA 6 Approve Remuneration Report

Executive Incentive Schemes

This incentive scheme is not aligned with the interests of shareholders as it allows awards to vest after less than three years.

Against United Kingdom
25/04/2013
Annual
Colt Group SA 24 Amend Share Grant Plan

Remuneration Report

We oppose rises in bonus potential that are not matched by a commensurate rise in performance hurdle.

Against United Kingdom
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie Plastic Omnium 8 Authorise Issuance of Equity or Equity-Linked Securities with Pre-emptive Rights up to Aggregate Nominal Amount of EUR 300 Million

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie Plastic Omnium 9 Authorise Board to Increase Capital in the Event of Additional Demand Related to Delegation Submitted to Shareholder Vote Above

Capital Structure

Not in shareholders’ best interests as this authority does not reflect international best practice.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie Plastic Omnium 10 Authorise up to 2.5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Stock Option Plan

Authorise Issued Capital for use in Incentive Plan

The underlying features of this scheme did not reflect international best practice. We therefore did not support this authority to allocate shares to the scheme.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie Plastic Omnium 11 Authorise up to 2.5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Authorise Issued Capital for use in Incentive Plan

The underlying features of this scheme did not reflect international best practice. We therefore did not support this authority to allocate shares to the scheme.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual
Sandvik AB 17 Spin-off and Listing of Sandvik Materials Technology on the Stock Exchange; Distribute Shares to Sandvik's Shareholders

Shareholder Proposal

Not in shareholders’ best interests.

Against Sweden
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Schneider Electric SA 34 Elect Claude Briquet as Representative of Employee Shareholders to the Board

Elect Employee Shareholder Representative

Shareholders are required to elect only one employee representative to the board. It is our view that this nominee did not represent the best interests of shareholders.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Schneider Electric SA 36 Elect Thierry Jacquet as Representative of Employee Shareholders to the Board

Elect Employee Shareholder Representative

Shareholders are required to elect only one employee representative to the board. It is our view that this nominee did not represent the best interests of shareholders.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Schneider Electric SA 37 Elect Jean-Michel Vedrine as Representative of Employee Shareholders to the Board

Elect Employee Shareholder Representative

Shareholders are required to elect only one employee representative to the board. It is our view that this nominee did not represent the best interests of shareholders.

Against France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Scor SE 4 Approve Auditors' Special Report on Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders, however we accepted that the company had made some improvements during the year, and we were able to abstain.

Abstain France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Scor SE 22 Authorise up to 1 Million of Shares for Use in Stock Option Plan

Authorise Issued Capital for use in Incentive Plan

The underlying features of this scheme did not reflect international best practice. However we acknowledged some points of explanation provided by the company in this case, and took into account that the company had provided better disclosure on this issue than many of its peers.

Abstain France
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
Scor SE 23 Authorise up to 4 Million of Shares for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Authorise Issued Capital for use in Incentive Plan

The underlying features of this scheme did not reflect international best practice. However we acknowledged some points of explanation provided by the company in this case, and took into account that the company had provided better disclosure on this issue than many of its peers.

Abstain France
25/04/2013
Annual
Taylor Wimpey plc 16 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

We did not feel that the proposed increase in bonus potential was justified by corporate performance in recent years and therefore abstained on the approval of the remuneration report.

Abstain United Kingdom
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
UCB SA E.2 Authorise Board to Increase Authorised Capital up to EUR 500 Million, Including by way of Issuance of Warrants or Convertible Bonds

Increase in Capital

The potential dilution from this increase is against best practice guidelines, therefore we were unsupportive.

Against Belgium
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
UCB SA E.3 Authorise Board to Issue Warrants/ Convertible Bonds in the Event of a Public Tender Offer or Share Exchange Offer Up to EUR 500 Million and Amend Articles Accordingly

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against Belgium
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
UCB SA E.5 Authorise Board to Repurchase and to Reissue Shares in the Event of a Serious and Imminent Harm and Amend Articles Accordingly

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against Belgium
25/04/2013
Annual/Special
UCB SA E.6 Authorise Repurchase of Up to 20 Percent of Issued Share Capital if Item E.5 is not Approved

Share Repurchase

The structure of this authority was against best practice guidelines, therefore we were unsupportive.

Against Belgium
26/04/2013
Annual/Special
L Oreal 10 Authorise up to 0.6 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

The structure of this scheme is not aligned with the interests of shareholders

Against France
26/04/2013
Annual
Pearson plc 13 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report

Remuneration policies are not aligned with our interests as shareholders.

Abstain United Kingdom
29/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie industrielle et financiere d ingenierie Ingenico 6 Approve Severance Payment Agreement with Philippe Lazare

Related Party Transactions

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
29/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie industrielle et financiere d ingenierie Ingenico 10 Authorise Repurchase of Up to 10 Percent of Issued Share Capital

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
29/04/2013
Annual/Special
Compagnie industrielle et financiere d ingenierie Ingenico 23 Allow Board to Use All Authorisations and/or Delegations in the Event of a Public Tender Offer

Poison Pills/Anti-takeover devices

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France
29/04/2013
Annual
Luxottica Group S.p.A. 3 Approve Performance Shares Plan 2013-2017

Executive Incentive Schemes

The structure of this scheme is not aligned with the interests of shareholders

Against Italy
30/04/2013
Annual/Special
Atlantia SPA 2 Authorise Share Repurchase Program and Reissuance of Repurchased Shares

Share Repurchase

The structure of this authority was against best practice guidelines, therefore we were unsupportive.

Against Italy
30/04/2013
Annual/Special
Atlantia SPA 4 Approve Remuneration Report

Remuneration Report/Policy

Insufficient disclosure of the features of remuneration policy.

Against Italy
30/04/2013
Annual/Special
Atlantia SPA 5 Amend Equity Compensation Plans

Executive Incentive Schemes

Performance conditions were considered undemanding and there was no cap on the size of award that could be made to individuals.

Against Italy
30/04/2013
Annual
Deutz AG 6 Approve Remuneration System for Management Board Members

Executive Incentive Schemes

There is a lack of cap on the size of the awards.

Against Germany
30/04/2013
Annual/Special
Renault 15 Authorise up to 1.5 Percent of Issued Capital for Use in Restricted Stock Plan

Executive Incentive Schemes

Lack of disclosure on performance criteria

Abstain France
30/04/2013
Annual/Special
Vivendi 3 Approve Auditors' Special Report on Related-Party Transactions

Related Party Transactions

We did not believe this to be in the best interests of all shareholders

Against France